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This paper investigates the bankruptcy of Aloha Airlines and its exit from 
Hawaii’s interisland passenger market in order to examine whether 
government intervention is warranted based on the presumed benefits to 
the general public. A regression analysis of interisland traffic volume does 
not identify any substantial decline in interisland passengers immediately 
following Aloha’s closure. A government’s decision to bailout a firm should 
incorporate information on market structure, as the presence of excess 
capacity can alleviate damage to consumers. 
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  Bankruptcy of a company and its exit from input and final good 
markets is one of several channels by which markets adjust to supply or 
demand shocks. Efficiency of resources allocation is improved when 
resources are withdrawn from a proven loss-making use and moved to a 
potentially profitable one. This general principle, however, allows 
exceptional cases in which a government rescue of failing corporations could 
theoretically enhance market efficiency. For example, Gorton and Huang 
(2004) present a model in which governments facilitate the reallocation 
process by lessening liquidity constraints. 
 
  Irrespective of the theoretical foundations for a bailout and the 
difficulties in successfully executing a bailout, governments in democracies 
have private incentives to extend assistance to some troubled companies. 
First, elected officials may have vested interests in survival of some 
businesses. Faccio, Masulis and McConnell (2006) find that politically 
connected firms are more likely to receive government bailout. Second, 
politicians may make efforts to appear benevolent by helping a business on 
the verge of collapse, arguing that its service is of great benefit to the 
population, hence voters, in general.1 
 
  Whether the arguments for a particular bailout satisfy necessary 
theoretical criteria or are merely self-serving, it is surely impractical to 
expect that a long-run cost-benefits analysis of a public rescue could be 
available to government officials and the public during the short period of 
bailout decision-making. Projections of various economic scenarios that 
could materialize after a bailout (or in its absence) inevitably depend on 
assumptions regarding the effectiveness of a bailout and the future state of 
the economy. This difficulty in turn invites a focus on the immediate cost of 
a large corporate failure, with the failing company and government 
emphasizing how the supply shock from the firm’s exit could damage both 
consumers and the firm’s workers. 
 
                                                  
1  Politicians’ calculations of voter perceptions could create the situation in which 
theoretically sound bailouts are delayed. See Brown, O'Neil and Ding (2005). 
 1  The objective of this paper is to make an assessment of the short-run 
cost of corporate failure by analyzing data from Hawaii’s interisland air 
markets both before and after the 2008 collapse of Aloha Airlines. The 
Hawaii State government rushed to develop and implement a rescue 
package but Aloha’s sudden exit cut short  these  efforts.  The  “almost 
implemented bailout” provides an opportunity to see whether the 
interisland market disruptions proved to be sufficiently large to justify a 
bailout. 
 
  The paper is organized as follows. The next section gives a brief 
background to Hawaii’s interisland passenger market, including events 
leading to the shutdown of Aloha’s operations. The third section analyses 
the interisland passenger volume at the time of the supply shock in the form 
of Aloha’s exit, and evaluates if there was any significant disruption to the 
market. The section also uses daily arrival data to the state to assess if 
there was any immediate consequence on the tourism. The fourth section 
examines the air travel price data to investigate the impacts on the price 
dimension, which is followed by the concluding section. 
 
2. Hawaii’s Interisland Air Travel and Exit of Aloha Airlines 
 
  In 1959, Hawaii, an island chain in the Northern Pacific Ocean, 
became the 50th state in the United States. Most of its people reside on six 
islands separated from each other by 30-250 miles. Since the advent of the 
civil aviation, the interisland flight has been an important means of 
transportation for the state’s population. Figure 1 shows the annual number 
of interisland passengers since 1960. Annual interisland passengers more 
than tripled in the 1960s and doubled in the 1970s. After 1981, annual 
passenger counts never dipped below 7 million a year. 
 
  The principal providers of this service were Hawaiian Airlines and 
Aloha Airlines, which started operations in 1929 and 1946, respectively. 
They dominated the market in the post-WWII period. Although there were 
occasional efforts by a third carrier to enter the interisland passenger 
market using low fare as leverage, challenges were short-lived.2 The 
                                                  
2  Forman (2005) presents a detailed history of Hawaii’s civil aviation industry such as 
 2dominant position of Hawaiian and Aloha did not, however, guarantee their 
financial health. Swings in profitability led to liquidity problems and debt 
restructuring on several occasions.3 The terrorist attacks of September 2001 
led to a sharp slump in interisland air travel, which also aggravated their 
performance. 
 
  In order to revive their profitability, the two airlines received 
approval from the federal government in September 2002 to implement an 
agreement for coordinating their capacity to equally divide the interisland 
market. In the event a party exceeded its authorized share, a penalty would 
be imposed according to the deviation from the agreement. Although this 
antitrust immunity did not allow collusion in the pricing, Blair, Mak, and 
Bonham (2007) and Kamita (2010) found that the agreement led to 
increases in interisland airfares.4 Kamita (2010) further found that the 
price hike persisted after the agreement expired in 2003. In spite of the 
price rise that accompanied the antitrust immunity, the financial conditions 
of both airlines remained unstable. Hawaiian filed for Chapter 11 
bankruptcy protection in March 2003 (to emerge in April 2005), and Aloha 
joined in December 2004 (until February 2005). 
 
  Competition on the price dimension resumed with the entry of a 
subsidiary of Phoenix-based Mesa Air Group to the interisland market in 
June 2006.5 Between Hawaiian and Aloha, it was the latter that suffered 
most from the return of price competition due to its greater reliance on 
interisland routes in its operations. Aloha filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
protection on March 20, 2008, less than three years after exiting the 
previous protection. In response to the filing, state legislators proposed a 
financial rescue that could include loan guarantees, landing fee waivers and 
                                                                                                                                                  
rivalries between the two companies and the entry and exit of other airlines, including 
Mid Pacific Airlines (1981-1988) and Mahalo Airlines (1993-1997). 
3  For example, Hawaiian filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in October 1993, 
to exit in September of the following year. 
4  Brueckner (2003) identified an opposite effect of antitrust immunity in the analysis 
of cooperation among international carriers in the form of codesharing and antitrust 
immunity: The presence of immunity reduced the fare for interline passengers. 
5  Island Air, an Aloha Airlines’ subsidiary until May 2004, was independently servicing 
17 interisland routes at that time. Entry of Mesa resulted in lay-off of 65 of Island’s 415 
workers and termination of its five routes in December 2006. See Daysog (2006). 
 3the elimination of the excise tax on jet fuel to lessen the financial burden of 
the airline. Daysog (2008) quotes State Senate Ways and Means Committee 
Chairwoman’s comment, “It’s not unprecedented for us to try to assist 
businesses that are important to Hawaii.”6 
 
  On March 30 Aloha announced its intent to cease all passenger 
operations the following day. Governor Linda Lingle asked the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Court not to allow the company to terminate its passenger 
service, and made the statement that “Our main concerns are threefold – 
first and foremost the 1,900 employees and their families, the need for 
continued air service for our residents and visitors, and protection of the 
state's long-term fiscal and economic interests.” Since the State of Hawaii is 
an island chain, interisland air service is a vital part of the transportation 
network for its residents. The State Government’s attempts to assist a 
failing airline business could be interpreted as an effort to protect the 
infrastructure for the benefit of the general public. 
 
  No viable financial rescue package materialized by the end of the 
month, and the Governor’s request was rejected by the U.S. Bankruptcy 
Court. Aloha Airlines shut down its passenger operation on April 1. The 
sudden exit of a major company from the air transport market, combined 
with the willingness on the side of local elected officials to extend financial 
help, provides an opportunity for a case study into the merits of government 
intervention against the stated objective of serving the general public. The 
short period of time between the airline’s bankruptcy filing and termination 
of its operation implies that market adjustments leading up to its exit must 
have been absent, thereby allowing an assessment of consequences of its 
exit without any complications from factors that otherwise might have 
arisen in the intervening period.    This paper focuses on the second 
“concern” in the Governor’s statement, and investigates whether supply of 
the local air travel service was disrupted because the State of Hawaii did 
not rescue Aloha Airlines. I proceed from the proposition that the greater 
the disruption to interisland air service caused by Aloha’s exit, the stronger 
the case for government intervention would have been. 
                                                  
6  At the time of Hawaiian’s bankruptcy in 1993, the state approved a $14 million loan 
guarantee for the company. 
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  One perspective for evaluating the potential impact of Aloha’s exit on 
interisland travel is to examine the industry’s market structure. The fact 
that the federal government granted Aloha and Hawaiian the rights to 
divide the market suggests that they were duopolists with excess capacity. 
The fare increase that accompanied the agreement, however, invited entry 
of the third carrier, and exacerbated the capacity issue.7 If the exit of Aloha 
was part of a process by which market equilibrium was restored, loss of its 
interisland flights should not have brought about significant interruptions 
to the market. Thus, whether the remaining airlines could meet “the need 
for continued air service for our residents and visitors”, in the wording of 
Governor’s statement, is the criterion to judge the cost of Aloha’s exit. 
 
3. Impact on Interisland Air Travel 
 
  The first objective of the paper is to empirically investigate whether 
Aloha’s exit led to a disruption of the interisland passenger travel. If excess 
capacity led to Aloha’s exit and the remaining carriers filled the gaps left by 
Aloha, we may not find a drop in interisland travel volume following Aloha’ 
shutdown.8 The analysis tests whether there was a fall in monthly 
interisland passengers at Honolulu International Airport immediately after 
Aloha’s exit.9 The airport in Honolulu serves as a hub for interisland traffic, 
and is the only airport that is connected with all the other main islands by 
scheduled flights. Thus, its passenger data reflect the general local market 
environment. 
 
  Figure 2 shows the number of interisland passengers at the 
Honolulu International Airport, which exhibits large monthly fluctuations. 
This is because the interisland flights serve both local residents and 
                                                  
7  Goolsbee and Syverson (2008) investigated the development of route network of 
Southwest Airlines and found that incumbent airlines reduced airfares in the face of 
the threat of entry. Graham, Kaplan and Sibley (1983) argued that, prior to the 
deregulation of the 1980s, airline regulation was associated with excess capacity in the 
industry. 
8  Wiles (2008) described efforts by remaining carriers to quickly increase the 
interisland flights after Aloha’s exit. 
9  Monthly interisland passenger data are collected by the Airports Division, Hawaii 
State Department of Transportation. 
 5out-of-state tourists, and the latter passengers change substantially 
depending on the tourism season. This is demonstrated by the 
corresponding movement of arriving passengers to the state in the same 
graph.10 Thus, in the regression analysis to identify the determinants of 
monthly interisland passengers (ISLAND), the monthly visitor arrival from 
out-of-state (VISITOR) enters as an explanatory variable in the following 
specification: 
 
 ISLAND  t = α + β1 VISITOR t + β2 FARE t +∑ΦkDUMMYk, 
 
where the price effect is isolated by the fare index at the airport in Honolulu 
(FARE). The quarterly “air travel price index (ATPI)”, which consists of the 
price charged by the airlines plus any additional taxes and fees, have been 
published by the Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS) of the U.S. 
Department of Transportation since the first quarter of 1995 for 85 U.S. 
airports.11 The FARE variable is its index at the Honolulu International 
Airport. Dummy variables are for April 2008, May 2008, and the period 
prior to September 2001 (Pre-911), the first two of which are the primary 
concern of the inquiry. The sample period is the 92 months between October 
2000 and May 2008, and summary statistics of the variables are presented 
in Table 1. 
 
  Regression estimates are obtained with FARE converted to a 
constant-price base. Since the airfare is presumed to be simultaneously 
determined with the passenger numbers, the estimates are obtained by the 
two-stage least squares (2SLS). The FARE is instrumented by the national 
ATPI series. Regression results are presented in Table 2. Three 
specifications differ by the treatment of month and year dummies. In all 
specifications the number of visitors to the islands (VISITOR) is positively 
associated with the interisland travel volume, although the magnitude of 
                                                  
10  The number of out-of-state arriving passengers is published by the State 
Department of Business, Economic Development and Tourism (DBEDT). 
11  The index is based on a 10 percent sample of the tickets used during a given quarter 
at individual airports collected as the Passenger Origin and Destination (O&D) Survey. 
For price comparison purposes, itineraries flown in each quarter are matched up with 
similar itineraries in other quarters. This process is designed to eliminate the index 
 6the impact varies widely. The estimated coefficients for the April 2008 and 
May 2008 dummies are not statistically significant in any specification. The 
potentially negative impact of the grounding of Aloha’s fleet on interisland 
traffic volume is not detected, which provides little support for a public 
rescue of the airline in order to mitigate severe market disruptions from the 
bankruptcy. 
 
  The preceding analysis treated the visitor arrival to the state as one 
of the determinants of the interisland flight passengers. It is, however, 
possible that the interisland market conditions affect the visitor arrivals, as 
tourists may plan their Hawaii trip around their ability to book a block of 
interisland seats on desired dates as part of their itinerary. If this is the case, 
visitors to Hawaii may have decreased as a result of Aloha’s shutdown.12 
The estimated coefficient on the visitor arrival variable could then be biased 
as it may be picking up supply shocks that would otherwise be captured by 
estimated coefficients on the April and May 2008 dummy variables. The 
following inquiry tests this possibility by investigating whether visitor 
arrivals fell in the period following Aloha’s exit. 
 
  The analysis uses a sample of daily passenger arrivals published by 
DBEDT, which contains 3,651 observations from September 2, 2000 through 
August 31, 2010. The impact of the Aloha closure is studied as an 
intervention analysis using an ARMA (autoregressive and moving average) 
estimation framework:13 
 






















  The immediate effect of Aloha’s exit should be captured by estimated 
                                                                                                                                                  
change that arises from the itinerary composition shifts at individual airports. 
12  Aloha’s mainland routes were also terminated at the end of March, which could 
negatively affect tourist arrivals in Hawaii.   
13  Baumann, Matheson, and Muroi (2009) used an ARIMA estimation framework to 
investigate the effect of sports events on Hawaii’s tourism as proxied by DBEDT’s daily 
passenger arrival data. 
 7coefficients of the EXIT dummy variables representing (i) seven days 
between April 1 and 7 as well as (ii) eight weeks in April and May. As tourist 
flows to Hawaii fluctuate across years, months, and days of the week, the 
regression also include dummy variables for individual years, months, and 
days of the week. The Sep_2001 dummy takes a value of one for September 
11-13, 2001 to isolate the effect of airport closure following the terrorist 
attacks.14 
 
  Regression estimates are reported in Table 3. The first column (I) 
shows the daily effects for April 1-7, and the second (II) the weekly effects 
for the eight weeks following Aloha’s exit. The coefficients of the 
autoregressive and moving average process are statistically significant at 
the 1% level in both of them. Although many of the estimated coefficients on 
the EXIT dummies are negative, none of them are statistically significant. 
The results are robust to changes in specifications, such as various 
combinations of AR and MA dimensions between 1 and 3 and 
first-differencing of passenger arrival data (i.e., estimates with ARIMA 
framework). The exit of Aloha Airlines did not give rise to a large fall in air 
travel to Hawaii, and the estimated negative coefficients are not statistically 
significant.15 This result strengthens the results obtained from the 
regression analysis of monthly interisland passenger data. Termination of 
Aloha’s operation did not result in an abrupt loss of interisland passengers 
or tourists to Hawaii.16 
                                                  
14  Although it is likely to take time for scheduled flights to resume their normal 
operation after airport closures, the dummy is specified to cover only the actual closure 
dates due to the difficulty of determining the length of impacts. See Rupp, Holmes and 
DeSimone (2005) for a detailed study on the schedule recovery after closures. 
15  ATA Airlines, an airline servicing the routes between Hawaii and four mainland 
cities, filed for bankruptcy to immediately cease its operations on April 2, 2008. If ATA’s 
closure had resulted in a decrease in the visitor arrival to the state, the estimated 
coefficients would have been biased for overestimating negative impacts of Aloha’s exit. 
In this sense, that the exit of Aloha did not lead to a reduction in arrivals represents a 
conservative assessment. 
16  Lawrence S. Hershfield, Chairman of Hawaiian Airlines’ Board of Directors, wrote 
about Hawaiian’s response to the exit of Aloha in his “Letter to Shareholders” attached 
to the company’s Annual Report 2008: “Responsibility fell to Hawaiian Airlines to 
prevent a meltdown in the State’s transportation system,...    In this regard, we can all 
be very proud of our Company’s performance. Instead of chaos, we had order at each of 
our airports. Not one of Aloha’s interisland customers was left stranded.” Vorsino 
(2008), on the other hand, reported anecdotal evidence to the contrary, in terms of 
substantial confusions and complaints among Aloha’s customers on April 1, 2008. 
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4. Effects on Airfare 
 
  Even if the exit of one major carrier did not constitute a supply 
shock that dented interisland travel, it could have reduced competition 
among remaining airlines, thereby exerting upward pressure on airfares. 
This section investigates whether closure of Aloha led to higher fares in 
Hawaii and, if it did, examines their magnitude relative to the price changes 
observed during the Aloha-Hawaiian antitrust immunity in 2003 and after 
the entry of a third airline in 2006. The price index to be used is BTS’ ATPI, 
which is available for 60 quarters from the first quarter of 1995 to the last 
quarter of 2009 for the total of 85 U.S. airports, including four in Hawaii.17 
 
  The objective of the analysis is to identify whether changes in 
airfares at Hawaii airports deviated from those at other U.S. airports. The 
percent changes in fare indices at individual airports are regressed, in a 
fixed effects specification, in the following form; 
 





















Explanatory variables include quarterly time-dummies (Qt) as well as 
dummy variables representing airports in Hawaii (HAWAIIs). The Hawaii 
dummies are specified for five quarters (i) after Aloha’s exit in April 2008, 
(ii) following the antitrust immunity in the first quarter of 2003, and (iii) 
following entry of a third carrier in the third quarter of 2006. If these three 
events, i.e., Aloha exit, antitrust immunity, and new entry to the market, led 
to price changes unique to Hawaii, estimated coefficients on their dummies 
should be non-zero and statistically significant. 
 
  Estimates are presented in Table 4. The first column (I) uses 
changes in travel costs over the previous quarter as the dependent variable, 
and the second column (II) examines the determinants of the fare changes 
over the same quarter of the previous year. The estimated coefficient on the 
                                                  
17  The four airports (and the island on which each is located) are: Honolulu (Oahu), 
Kahului (Maui), Kona (Hawaii), and Lihue (Kauai). 
 9first dummy for the Aloha exit in (I) suggests that the ticket price in Hawaii 
showed an extra 14.9 percent point increase over the nationwide change in 
the quarter immediately after the Aloha closure. It is notable, however, that 
the price hike was not sustained thereafter; no statistically significant 
positive coefficient was identified in the following four quarters. This finding 
is consistent with the estimates for annual fare changes in (II), in which 
estimated coefficients for the quarters following Aloha’s exit grew 
consistently smaller from 22.8 in 2008_Q1 to 6.172 in 2009_Q1. In 2009_Q2, 
a year after the exit, the fare change at airports in Hawaii was found to be 
smaller by 11.8 percent point than the nation in general. 
 
  The fare changes observed at the time of the implementation of 
antitrust immunity provide an interesting comparison. Estimated 
coefficients on dummy variables for the period of antitrust immunity given 
to Hawaiian and Aloha in 2003 in (II) suggest that the two airlines managed 
to maintain higher airfares for an extended period, with the annual price 
increase in Hawaii 15.8 percent points higher than nationwide in the final 
quarter of 2003. The fare continued to increase in the first quarter of 2004, 
as demonstrated by the positive and significant coefficients of 2004_Q1 in 
both specifications.
18 Although the existing market structure was a duopoly 
in both periods, the competitive force must have been more pronounced after 
Aloha’s exit in which there was no antitrust immunity. The estimates for the 
period after entry of the third carrier further support the importance of the 
competition. As a result of entry, air travel began to become less expensive 




  This paper investigated the impact of Aloha Airlines’ exit on Hawaii’s 
consumers by examining how the exit affected interisland traffic volume. 
The regression analysis did not identify any statistically significant decline 
in interisland passengers immediately following Aloha’s demise. Nor did the 
number of out-of-state visitors show a statistically significant drop. Clearly, 
the remaining carriers responded by filling gaps left by Aloha. The Aloha 
                                                  
18  This result is consistent with Kamita (2010), which found that the price effect of 
antitrust immunity remained after it has expired. 
 10exit is consistent with theoretical predictions regarding how a market with 
excess capacity would adjust to the exit of a firm. Although interisland air 
consumers were presented with some increase in airfares after Aloha closed 
down, the price effect grew smaller as adjustments took place in the market. 
 
  These results suggest that governments should be careful in 
assessing the option of a corporate bailout to a large corporation in a vital 
oligopolistic industry. If the rationale for the rescue is to alleviate potential 
negative impacts on consumers in general, it is critical for governments to 
take into account the existing market structure. Analysis of the Aloha exit 
shows that consumer losses stemming from a large firm’s exit from an 
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 14Figure 2. Interisland Passengers at the Honolulu International Airport and Visitor 













































 15Table 1. Summary Statistics: October 2000 - May 2008 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variables    Mean  Standard  Deviation  Min.       Max. 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
ISLAND    325,823.1     36,201.3       254,991      417,803 
 
April  2008       0.011    0.104          0     1 
May  2008       0.011    0.104          0     1 
Pre-911        0.120  0.326          0     1 
VISITOR    648,376.1     86,145.6       413,254      843,064 
FARE          140.2         13.1        118.81       170.87 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 16Table 2. Determinants of Interisland Passenger Number: 2SLS Estimates 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
   I   II   III 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
April 2008    5.610 x 103  -38.713 x 103  -17.269 x 103 
   (0.29)   (0.30)   (0.28) 
 
May 2008    10.274 x 103  -36.597 x 103  -15.116 x 103 
   (0.54)   (0.29)   (0.25) 
 
Pre_911    42.354  x  103 ***  28.436 x 103 *  32.671 x 103 
   (5.58)   (1.78)   (1.64) 
 
VISITOR    0.059 *    0.333 ***  0.275 * 
   (1.67)   (3.01)   (1.89) 
 
FARE    -5.182  x  103 ***  2.676 x 103  1.088 x 103 
   (2.69)   (0.23)   (0.17) 
 
Month  Dummies   YES   NO   YES 
Year  Dummies   NO   YES   YES 
 
Adjusted  R-squared  0.760   0.740   0.862 
F-statistic   17.21   23.38   25.30 
(P-value    0.000   0.000   0.000) 
No.  of  Obs.   92   92   92 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Note: In parentheses are t-statistics. *** and * indicate statistical significance at the 
1% and 10% level. Coefficients of month/year dummies are not reported for brevity.   
 17Table 3. ARMA Regressions Results for Daily Arrival to Hawaii 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    I     I I    
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Day 1 (April 1)      674.067 (0.18) 
Day 2 (April 2)    - 455.302 (0.11) 
Day 3 (April 3)    - 207.977 (0.05) 
Day 4 (April 4)    -2456.190 (0.66) 
Day 5 (April 5)    -1198.173 (0.36) 
Day 6 (April 6)      213.653 (0.08) 
Day 7 (April 7)      968.003 (0.49) 
 
Week 1 (April 1-7)          -396.725 (0.19) 
Week 2 (April 8-14)        -2036.503 (0.45) 
Week 3 (April 15-21)        -2135.345 (0.54) 
Week 4 (April 22-28)        -2121.419 (0.43) 
Week 5 (April 29- May 5)       -1497.058 (0.38) 
Week 6 (May 6-12)        -2449.375 (0.48) 
Week 7 (May 13-19)        -2038.960 (0.49) 
Week 8 (May 20-26)        -1278.662 (0.23) 
 
AR (1)        0.908*** (110.30)    0.908*** (110.18) 
MA  (1)    -0.136***  (7.79)   -0.137***  (7.82) 
Log  Likelihood   -31184.09   -31184.92 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Note: Coefficients for dummy variables for individual years, months, days of the week, 
as well as closure of airports in September 2001 (11th-13th) are also estimated, but not 
reported for brevity. They are available from the author upon request. In parentheses 




Table 4. Impact of Aloha Exit on Airfare in Hawaii: Fixed Effects Analysis 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
   I  (Quarterly  Change)  II  (Annual  Change) 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
[Aloha Exit] 
2008_Q2  14.948***  (9.17)   22.833***  (8.97) 
2008_Q3    2.210  (1.30)   20.421***  (8.02) 
2008_Q4  -6.706***(4.12)   17.448***  (6.85) 
2009_Q1    -1.869  (1.15)     6.172**  (2.42) 
2009_Q2  -5.752***(3.53)   -11.768***  (4.62) 
 
[Antitrust Immunity] 
2003_Q1    3.963**  (2.45)     7.481***  (2.94) 
2003_Q2    8.608***  (5.28)   13.578***  (5.33) 
2003_Q3     2.641  (1.62)   13.292***  (5.22) 
2003_Q4    -0.533  (0.33)   15.776***  (6.20) 
2004_Q1    2.806*  (1.72)   14.270***  (5.61) 
 
[Entry] 
2006_Q3      -6.737*** (4.13)     -21.705*** (8.53) 
2006_Q4    -6.427*** (3.94)     -21.663*** (8.51) 
2007_Q1    -2.394  (1.47)     -22.102***  (8.68) 
2007_Q2     0.951  (0.58)   -14.344***  (5.63) 
2007_Q3    4.673***(2.87)     -3.924  (1.54) 
 
Adjusted  R-squared  0.452    0.547 
F-statistic   55.23    79.48 
(P-value    0.000    0.000) 
No. of Observations  5015 (85 x 59)    4760 (85 x 56) 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Note: Coefficients for dummy variables for individual quarters (1995_Q3 - 2009_Q4 in I, 
and 1996_Q2 - 2009_Q4 in II) are also estimated, but not reported for brevity. They are 
available from the author upon request. In parentheses are t-statistics. ***, ** and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 